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FORESEEING THE PAST: PROBABILITY 
AND ANCIENT GREEK DECISION-MAKING 
By Paul Vădan 
 
“Probability does not exist.” 
– Bruno de Finetti 
 
Summary: The article explores the concept of probability in ancient Greece from a non-
scientific perspective and shows how ancient decision-makers used historical data to make 
calculated decisions and speculate about the future. First, the paper considers how 
quantitative data was used by ancient Greek communities to make economic projections. 
It then shows how ancient Greek generals used the same conceptual tools to determine 
their odds of victory by tallying up and comparing the number and composition of armies 
and resources available to them and their enemy. In the third section, the paper examines 
how qualitative probability was articulated through the language of hope and likelihood to 
formulate chances of success in moments of crisis. Finally, the paper shows that ancient 
decision-makers implemented “power laws” to adapt to changing circumstances and the 




In his published conversations with Christopher Pierson, sociologist 
Anthony Giddens contends that human history turned “modern” when 
the mathematical discoveries of the 16th century set the foundations of 
the sciences of statistics and probability.1 For the first time in human 
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ments at various stages in the paper’s development. Caitlin Miller’s proofreading and 
suggestions have improved the clarity and structure of this paper. I would also like 
to thank the organizers and participants of the Ancient Societies Workshop at the 
University of Chicago, whose questions and suggestions have helped me strengthen 
PAUL VĂDAN  18 
history, human actors could quantify uncertainty and think about the 
future through the modern concept of risk. Giddens could thus announce 
that “risk has replaced fortuna,” 2  confident that the “modern” 
enlightened world has finally managed to shed the old superstitions of 
“traditional” societies by relying on the rational and “novel” sciences of 
statistics and probability to quantify, predict, and control an otherwise 
dangerous future.  
Giddens’ thesis has been influential in the study of sociology, and has 
also impacted the way classicists approach ancient decision-making. 
Notably, Mary Beard has characterized the Graeco-Roman world as an 
“aleatory society,” where the model of gambling luck governed the way 
the ancients approached danger. For Beard, “Rome was a culture that 
looked danger in the eye. It did not attempt to avert or calculate danger, 
but rather to assert (almost celebrate) the uncertainties, chances and 
dangers of human existence.”3 Her interpretation takes the form of a 
verdict that relegates ancient considerations of danger to the narrow 
and morally-charged concern with daring, “[facing] danger head-on,” 
since “anything like a calculation of the probability of danger, let alone 
a recognisable risk agenda,”4 was absent in antiquity. 
In fact, recent scholarly attempts to talk about ancient “risk-taking” 
have been countered by the same scientific argument pointing to the 
absence of mathematical probability in antiquity. For instance, Esther 
Eidinow’s (2007) non-quantitative approach to ancient Greek 
 
my argument. Finally, I benefited from conversations on ancient risk with Anna 
Francesca Bonnell-Freidin, Esther Eidinow, Stephen Kidd, and Brent Shaw. 
1 Giddens describes the modern world as “vastly more dynamic than any previous 
type of social order. It is a society – more technically, a complex of institutions – 
which unlike any preceding culture lives in the future rather than in the past.” Gid-
dens & Pierson 1998: 94. Similar arguments for a conceptual divide between antiq-
uity and modernity have been promoted by Christian Meier (1990), who argued that 
the modern concept of “the State” was absent in antiquity. Also, Reinhart Koselleck 
(2006) has argued that the modern idea of “crisis” referring to a political and eco-
nomic event was not found in the ancient notion of κρίσις; the argument has been 
disputed by Kuin & Klooster 2020: 3-14. 
2 Giddens 1990: 30. 
3 Beard 2011: 98. 
4 Beard 2011: 91, 98. 
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perceptions of risk has been critiqued by classically-trained sociologist 
of religions Kim Beerden (2013), who questions Eidinow’s use of the term 
“risk” as a modern imposition upon antiquity. Referencing Giddens’ 
work, Beerden considers risk as intimately linked to the modern sciences 
of statistics and probability, whereas “all [ancient Greek] expressions of 
thinking about the future differ crucially from modern conceptions of 
risk: there was no calculation of the chances or probability of disaster or 
success”; the ancients had to content themselves only with divination.5 
However, this modernist sociological attitude to risk and decision-
making carries with it an insidious claim: namely, that the modern 
world’s response to crisis is, in some sense, original, where 
contemporary issues have contemporary solutions. It follows that 
ancient experiences and crisis-solving mechanisms are no longer 
helpful, being relegated to the categories of superstition and credulity. 
What is more, this sociological insistence on technological progress as a 
marker of cognitive ability is less than truly explanatory, if not morally 
dubious, and attracts simplistic value judgments. Take, for instance, 
sociologist and philosopher Niklas Luhmann’s (1991) comment on the 
seeming absence of mathematical probability in antiquity, that Greek 
ingenuity had finally reached its limits, unable to explore futurity 
beyond the use of cosmology and a passive acceptance of divine agency.  
Likewise, economist Peter Bernstein (1996) deemed the failure of “the 
Greeks” to engage with probability theory as “astonishing,” concluding 
that “despite the emphasis that the Greeks placed on theory, they had 
little interest in applying it to any kind of technology that would have 
changed their views of the manageability of the future.” Bernstein adds 
that only after the mathematical revolution sparked by Pascal and 
Fermat did views about gambling move beyond ancient and outdated 
conceptions of chance: “The act of risk-taking floated free, untrammeled 
by the theory of risk management.”6 Consequently, ancient societies are 
denied a fundamental level of cognitive rationality, institutional 
complexity, and individual agency to anticipate, assess, and mitigate 
potential dangers. 
 
5 Beerden 2013: 202. 
6 Bernstein 1996: 11, 16. 
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And yet, as I will show in this article, the extant evidence pertaining 
to ancient decision-making counteracts these primitivist sociological 
attitudes towards the ancient world. Indeed, if we expand our enquiry 
beyond the narrow constraints of ancient mathematics, we find different 
strategies by which ancient decision-makers formulated and applied 
probabilistic thinking to quantify uncertainty and inform collective 
economic, social, and military decisions. To do so, I specifically focus on 
literary evidence from the 4th century BCE onwards when ancient 
thinkers started theorizing about probabilistic thinking in a systematic 
way by prescribing codes of behavior and systems of knowledge to 
calculate the future. I first show that in the absence of conclusive 
evidence pertaining to ancient mathematical probability, we 
nevertheless have instances where ancient decision-makers used 
abstract numbers to express odds of success about economic and military 
risks. I then assess the qualitative language of likelihood used by ancient 
decision-makers to assign gradations of risk to dangerous events. Finally, 
I turn to the use of the past by military leaders to imagine historical 
precedents to present circumstances as a way to generate statistical data 
and shape collective expectations about the future. In doing so, I bridge 
the conceptual divide between antiquity and modernity by highlighting 
the culturally-specific character of the concept of probability. 
1.  ANCIENT PROBABILITY AS A  
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
 
The narrative that probability is an inherently modern product of 
Enlightnement mathematicians has recently been dismissed by 
statistician Glenn Shafer (2018) as mere legend. Schafer assigns 
responsibility to the work of Ian Hacking (1975 and 1990) for further 
popularizing the notion that these polymaths were responsible for 
combining, for the first time, the philosophical ideas of belief and 
frequency.7 He points to pre-existing evidence collected by Marie-France 
Bru and Bernard Bru (2018), some from Arabic texts, discussing dice 
games and contracts that express probabilistic logic. An imporant 
 
7 Shafer 2018: 279. 
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instance is the famous 13th century CE poem De Vetula,8 whose author is 
clearly aware that some arrangements in dice games do not have the 
same force or frequency, whose complexity has been deemed by the Brus 
(2018) a veritable “calcul de chances.”9 For Shafer, such texts indicate an 
understanding of the character of probabiliy as the union between belief 
(betting) and frequency (outcome).10 
Nevertheless, Hacking has often defended his thesis from such 
criticisms by stating that “what is important is not the occurrence of a 
few probability ideas in antique texts but a use for them, a use that spans 
morals, politics, economics and social affairs, and which engenders a new 
era of conjecturing on the one hand and a new mode of representing 
reality on the other.”11 This statement, however, is unfair to both ancient 
and modern thinkers alike because the act of choosing a “birth moment” 
for a concept is a misleading exercise.12 For the sake of argument, one 
could just as easily claim that the real revolution in statistics and 
probability theory came not in the 17th century, but much later in 1933, 
when Andrei Kolmogorov laid the axiomatic foundations of probability 
theory by publishing his Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung.13 
Kolmogorov’s achievement eventually allowed the application of 
probability theory to solve economic problems, but only after World War 
II, when it was gradually employed in the modern financial system. That, 
however, would deny Cardano, Pascal, Fermat and all of Kolmogorov’s 
predecessors the cognitive capacity to think axiomatically about 
probability theory, which would be both unfair and misleading.  
And yet, while medievalists have been quick to take up Hacking’s 
challenge by highlighting the complex probabilistic character of so-
 
8 For a discussion on calculating permutations in ps.-Ovid’s De Vetula, see Kidd 2020: 
19-20. 
9 Bur & Bru 2018: 306. 
10 Shafer 2018: 280. 
11 Hacking 1975: 108. 
12 Similar arguments have been made against the presumed modern origin of concepts 
like “crisis” (Kuin & Klooster 2020), “intuition” (Struck 2016), “landscape” (Zientek 
2014) and “risk” (Vădan 2018). 
13 Shafer & Vovk 2001: 39: “Among mathematicians, its simplicity, clarity, and power 
made it the easy victor in the spirited debate on the foundations of probability that 
took place in the 1930s.”  
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called “aleatory contracts,”14 classicists have instead limited themselves 
to justifying the ostensibly rudimentary character of ancient theoretical 
mathematics. In a recent article on ancient gambling, Stephen Kidd 
(2020) has sought to account for the apparent absence of mathematical 
probability in antiquity by looking at the character of games that ancient 
gamblers played: whereas modern gamblers play games that require 
them to take individual risky bets based on personal calculations, ancient 
gamblers, by contrast, played games with previously agreed-upon group 
wagers, which rendered risk a communal affair. The result, Kidd 
explains, is that “the incentives to calculate such probable outcomes 
were not at all glaring, since there was simply no gambling game to 
which such calculations would have been applicable.”15 According to this 
argument, we would have to wait until the 16th century when gamblers 
finally had the incentive to calculate their individual gambling risks for 
profit, which would eventually lead them to ponder the theory of 
probability: “with new games to play, people began to think in a new 
way. That new form of thinking gave rise to mathematical probability 
and the related field of statistics.”16  
Kidd’s analysis of ancient games is impressive and highlights the 
importance of incentives to finding new solutions to old problems. He is 
also right to point out the cumulative, rather than individualistic, 
character of technological progress. But as is often the case, the 
presumed absence of a certain kind of technology does not necessarily 
 
14 Hald 2003: 32: “The basis of such contracts became the specification of conditions for 
the equity of the parties involved, which required assessment of risks combined with 
the possible gains and losses.” For the theological and legal aspects of risk-taking in 
the development of the concept of expectation in probability theory, see also Cou-
met (1970), Daston (1980), and Schneider (1980). 
15 Kidd 2020: 3, 5. It is worth noting that while Kidd (n. 16) acknowledges that ancients 
tried to get an advantage in dicing through cheating, he does not connect this phe-
nomenon with the possibility of probabilistic thinking. However, Jerzy Neyman 
(1976: 152) has interpreted tampered dice as an awareness by the cheater of the im-
portant phenomenon of long-run frequency. He mentions loaded dice found in Egyp-
tian Pharaonic burial chambers, suggesting that such an understanding of dice is as 
old as dicing itself.  
16 Kidd 2020: 22.  
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entail the absence of ideas about it.17 In fact, scholars have recently made 
the case that even modern technological industrial discoveries generally 
rely on non-scientific rather than scientific processes.18  Likewise, the 
absence of evidence poses a methodological challenge to historians 
because it does not automatically discard the possibility that such 
evidence did – or does – exist. Kidd’s argument thus needs to be 
considered with caution because it relies in part on the (supposed) 
silence of the evidence. To this point, Shafer is confident that there 
remains the real possibility of discovering ancient manuscripts detailing 
probabilistic thinking, especially in the oft-ignored Arabic manuscripts. 
Indeed, Reviel Netz (2016) has estimated that “we have attested 
something like 20% of ancient mathematical authors, and have extant 
something like 3%-5% of ancient mathematical texts.” 19  There thus 
remains the real possibility that some of them may have explored 
mathematical probability, as hinted at by a variety of philosophical 
works that touch on the subject, if only in a rudimentary way.20 In fact, it 
has been argued that the rise and rule of Rome negatively impacted 
scientific innovation, with the number of mathematicians and scientists 
regularly decreasing during the Roman empire, until finally becoming 
 
17 One notable example is the development of the abstract principles of thermodynam-
ics by Nicolas Carnot in the 1820s, one century after the implantation of Newcomen’s 
steam engine (Mokyr 2009: 124-44). From a different perspective on the ancient 
Greek world, John K. Davies (2003) approached Athenian democracy through sys-
tems analysis to explain its development in the 5th century BCE in the absence of a 
general Athenian political theory. Likewise, Josiah Ober (2008) showed how Athenian 
institutions allowed for the spread of knowledge needed by novice office holders to 
govern the state through “demotic clusters” of administrative memory, despite the 
absence of complex information networks. 
18 Bresson 2014: 67. See also Clark 2012 for the “idealist” model, and Allen 2009. 
19 Netz 2016: 85. Bru & Bru 2018: 302 also agree that we may yet unearth ancient Baby-
lonian tablets or Egyptian papyri that explore the concept of probability. 
20 Keyser & Scarborough 2018; Keyser & Irby-Massie 2002. For instance, we know of 
Xenokrates of Chalkedon’s now-lost work on combinatorics, entitled On Numbers. In 
contrast, most claims on ancient statistics focus almost exclusively on the rudimen-
tary observations of Cicero and Aristotle on dice and numbers, without considering 
the historical implications that these writers were not known as mathematicians, 
whose observations on the topic were perhaps influenced by other works. Cic. Div. 
1.23, 2.48, 2.121; Arist. Cael. 2.12 (292a30), PN 463b19-23, 3.4.1407b1. 
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negligible in the fifth century CE, 21  leading Alain Bresson (2014) to 
describe the history of Greek science as an interrupted process.22 We can 
thus imagine a scenario where diminishing interest in theoretical 
science would have discouraged further innovation, which then 
compounded the problem of manuscript preservation, some of whom 
still surviving in Arabic texts that have yet been discovered, read, or even 
translated. 
Even so, I suggest that we can bypass the problem of missing 
mathematical evidence by looking at instances of probabilistic thinking 
beyond mathematics. To do so, we need to expand our understanding of 
probability beyond the notion of a closed system governed by symmetry 
and abstract logic where numerical odds can be objectively calculated. 
This so-called “classical symmetry” model implies that probability 
theory could have only developed in a very specific historical context 
like gambling, whereas statistician David Spiegelhalter (2011) explains 
that “classical symmetry” is but one way to think about assigning 
probabilities to events. When it comes to real-world circumstances, 
Spiegelhalter points out that another means to quantify uncertainty is to 
use historical data, the so-called “frequentist” method: “If the future 
follows the same pattern as the past, then frequencies of events in 
history should reflect reasonable probabilities for events in the future,” 
thus rendering potential responses and outcomes to present 
circumstance rather predictable.23 
Mathematician and philosopher James Franklin (2001) concurs that 
probability in the modern form did not develop earlier in part for the 
simple reason that dice and other “classical symmetry” tools are not a 
reliable model to tackle real-world situations.24  Richard Thaler (2015) 
illustrates this problem succintly by distinguishing between “Econs” and 
“Humans,” where Econs are fully “rational” optimizers when it comes to 
economic theory. By contrast, Humans “misbehave” according to beliefs, 
instincts, and patterns of thought that are decidedly non-optimal. And 
since we do not live in a world of Econs but in a world of Humans, Thaler 
 
21 Keyser 2010. 
22 Bresson 2014: 68-69. 
23 Spiegelhalter 2011: 19. 
24 Franklin 2001: 334. 
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asserts that culturally-specific Human behaviors and experiences need 
to be considered when building theoretical models. For our purposes, 
Thaler’s approach is important because it also implies that one does not 
necessarily need to be versed in economic theory to behave 
economically by counting on historical data and personal experience, if 
not always precisely. 25Accordingly, I will show that the nature and 
contents of our sources speak to a Hellenistic interest in using historical 
data in social, political, and economic contexts other than gambling, to 
make calculated decisions and speculate about the future. As such, in the 
presumed absence of an ancient theory of probability, we can interpret 
the ancient evidence through a frequentist approach to identify clear 
instances of the philosophical concept of probability. 
2.  QUANTITATIVE PROBABILITY AND THE  
ANCIENT ECONOMY 
 
Ancient economic practices offer several illuminating instances of 
quantitative probability based on experience and historical data. At a 
fundamental level, agricultural production relied on risk-mitigating 
strategies meant to offset periods of wide climatic variation, with rainfall 
alternating sharply between wet and dry phases, which would have 
otherwise made it difficult to estimate yields and plan for the future.26 As 
ancient economists have already pointed out, diversification of crops 
and polyculture, the building of waterworks, together with 
sharecropping contracts, were some of the ways in which landowners 
sought to control the uncertainty of an irregular climate.27 These efforts 
 
25 Thaler 2015: 2-12. 
26 Sallares 1991: 393-95, building on the work of Peter Garnsey (1988), who has shown 
that despite regular crop failure, poleis generally did not experience famine due to 
various social and economic measures implemented. These included setting up re-
serves, price moderation, and patronage.  
27 Thomas Gallant (1991) provides a general overview of the resource strategies that 
Greek households would implement to deal with shortfalls in production. He illus-
trates how an agricultural system could adapt to the pressures of land life cycles 
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were aimed at absorbing the potential risk of resource scarcity in the 
chora, which in turn helped a community make better predictions about 
future agricultural yields. 
Following the same logic, ancient communities implemented various 
financial schemes to regulate public funds in an economic crisis. A 
somewhat morbid case study is offered by a Milesian inscription 
recording a public decision to create an annuity fund sometime in 
211/210 BCE to incentivize wealthy individuals to facilitate public 
investment:  
 
The Milesians have voted that those male or female citizens who wish 
to give 3,600 drachmas on behalf of themselves or on behalf of others 
[…]. In return for the money given to the city, each of the donors shall 
receive thirty drachmas per month from the city, for as long as they 
live. This money shall be given each year by the treasurers, 
withdrawing and distributing the money, in the same way as is 
prescribed in the laws for the priests and those who have won 
contests in games with a prize of crowns.28 
 
The initiative attracted no less than thirty-nine contributions from 
thirty-four individuals, who could recuperate their money within ten 
years. 29  There was, however, a catch: “If any of those who gave the 
proposed amount to the city depart from life, the people shall be released 
from repaying the donation and the reserved annuity, but one hundred 
 
through strategies of crop diversification, intercropping, irrigation, and fragmenta-
tion of land holdings. On more detailed examples from the Roman world, see the 
more recent work of Bruce Frier (2007) and Dennis Kehoe (2007). 
28 I. Milet. I.3 147, ll. 7-9, 18-22 ἐψηφίσθ̣αι Μιλησίοις· | τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους τῶμ 
πολιτῶν ἢ πολιτίδων δοῦνα[ι] | τῆι πόλει δραχμὰς τρισχιλίας ἑξακοσίας ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν 
ἢ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων | […] ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δοθέντος τῶι | δήμωι λαμβάνειν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως 
δραχμὰς τριάκοντα κατὰ μῆν[α] | τῶν δόντων ἕκαστον, ἕως ἂν ζῆι.  δίδοσθαι δὲ 
τοῦτο καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔτος̣ | ὑπὸ τῶν ταμιῶν, γινομένης τῆς ἐξαιρέσεως καὶ δόσεως τοῦ 
ἀργυ|ρίου, καθότι καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι καὶ νενικηκόσι τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας | ἐν τοῖς 
νόμοις συντέτακται. Trans. Sosin. According to the decree, it had not been possible 
for the city to collect an eisphora due to lack of funds and revenues; contra Franklin 
2001: 259. 
29 Recorded at Milet I.3 147, ll. 87-104. 
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and fifty drachmas shall be given to the relatives of each of them for their 
burial.” 30  Joshua Sosin (2014) interprets this “death clause” in the 
annuity contract as an attempt at financial speculation: if the state bank 
were to invest the collected money at a common rate of 12% per year, 
“the fund would have yielded Miletos a meager 2,808 drachmas annually, 
until the beneficiaries started to die out; every death tipped the scale in 
the state’s favor.”31 The demos, therefore, made a long-term bet whose 
value was directly correlated to the probability that older wealthier 
individuals would die before they would collect all the money they had 
made available for the public. 
And while the study of ancient demography and mortality rates is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that we have evidence 
from the Roman Empire of early attempts to calculate annuities based on 
life expectancy. The so-called “Ulpian’s Life Table” has been interpreted 
to represent the calculation of annuity premiums with an interest rate 
of about 1.5% based on age, which has helped scholars approximate a life 
expectancy of 40 years for someone aged 20.32 These numbers have been 
disputed, but scholars agree that we are looking at a crude annuity table. 
Returning to the Miletos decree, it is clear from its clauses that rich 
Milesians were themselves aware of the unavoidable mortality problem. 
They took advantage of a special representation clause, which perhaps 
they themselves maneuvered to have included in the decree, which 
stipulated that: 
 
if anyone registers the name of another male or female citizen, he 
shall be given the resulting annuity for as long as those registered are 
 
30 I. Milet. I.3 147, ll. 48-51 ἐὰν δέ τινες τῶν δόντων τῆι πόλει τὸ ἐκκείμενον πλῆθος 
ἐγλ̣[ί]|πω̣σι τὸμ βίον, τοῦ μὲν δοθέντος καὶ τοῦ ἐξαιρουμένου σιτηρεσίου | 
ἀπολελύσθαι τὸν δῆμον, δίδοσθαι δὲ εἰς ταφὴν τοῖς προσήκουσιν ὑ|πὲρ ἑκάστου 
δραχμὰς ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα. Trans. Sosin. 
31 Sosin 2014: 80. 
32 Pflaumer 2015: 2677-78; though his numbers are slightly different from Duncan-
Jones (1990: 94, 100-1), who suggests a life expectancy of 32 years from someone aged 
25, and that the beneficiaries of the life-annuities were slaves or ex-slaves, and not 
Roman elites. See also Frier 1982 and 2018 for a close analysis of the Ulpian Life Table 
and the projected life expectancy for both Roman men and women. See also Cicero’s 
observations on different mortality rates between youths and adults (Cic. Sen. 19). 
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alive. If the one who registered the name dies first, then the one 
whose name was registered shall receive the reserved annuity for the 
remainder of the time.33  
 
The clause was a way for rich families to bypass the “death clause” and 
recoup their investment within ten years and, furthermore, to continue 
to make a profit beyond that point. Sosin’s analysis of the names of the 
benefactors and their beneficiaries highlights the point that “Milesians 
were not demographers, but they could do the math,” explaining that “of 
all of the donations, roughly two thirds were made on behalf of a younger 
beneficiary or else by a young beneficiary on his or her own behalf.”34 
The inscription, therefore, is a classic example of the rich getting richer 
at the expense of the state during times of general financial hardship. 
But the greater point is that both the state and its wealthy families used 
their understanding of life expectancy to make more predictable 
financial speculations.35 
Financial incentives to quantify uncertainty also defined how ancient 
trade was conducted. Alain Bresson (2004 and 2016) has analyzed ancient 
insurance practices to show how investors quantified danger. He 
concludes that interest rates were directly correlated to the risk of 
 
33 I. Milet I.3 147, ll. 72-75 ἐὰν δέ τις ἕτερον ἀπογράψῃ ὄνομα τῶμ πολιτῶν ἢ 
πολιτ[ί]|δων, δίδοσθαι αὐτῶι τὸ γινόμενον σιτηρέσιον ζώντων τῶν 
ἀπογεγραμ|μένων. ἐὰν δὲ προεγλίπῃ ὁ ἀπογράψας, λαμβανέτω τῶν ἐφεξῆς | χρόνων 
τὸ ἐξαιρούμενον ὁ ἀπογραφείς. Trans. Sosin. 
34 Of the 39 donations, 22 were made on behalf of others, most probably sons and 
daughters, and of the 17 who contributed in their own names, two were females un-
der the kyrieia of men not said to be their husbands, and so perhaps orphaned mi-
nors, and two were male minors. Sosin 2014: 81. 
35 Other epigraphic examples of financial speculation include Austin 115, where the 
Olbians honor their benefactor Protogenes for, among other things, helping them 
purchase grain at a decent price, after correctly speculating that the price of a 
medimnos would increase exponentially: “Again in the priesthood of Plistarchus, 
when there was a severe shortage of corn and / grain was being sold at a medimnos 
and 60 two thirds for a gold coin, and it was clear that the price would rise further, 
and in fact the medimnos immediately reached the price of one gold coin and two 
thirds” (ll. 58-64). For an analysis of the financial crisis at Olbia, see Müller 2011. See 
also, Austin 118 where we get a glimpse into the public budget of Halikarnassos that 
includes a debt repayment plan and future funds to be earmarked for public works. 
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shipwreck, which was known to lenders from historical data. 36 
Estimations were precise enough to not only evaluate total damages but 
also to distinguish the number of shipwrecks in connection to the time 
of the year: while at the beginning of the sailing season one could expect 
one ship in five to sink, at the end of the season the chances could be as 
high as one in three.37 Literary evidence corroborates these finds, as we 
learn from the description of a maritime loan contract in Demosthenes’ 
Against Lakritos that interest rates regularly changed in accordance with 
the time of the year: during the high sailing season, interest was 
estimated at 22%, while after the rising of Arktouros the rate could go as 
high as 30%.38 Demosthenes thus provides us with a glimpse into the 
intricate ancient practice of putting numbers on uncertainty that 
determined the future behavior of traders and investors. Indeed, as 
Edward Cohen has shown, “maritime yields” were determined by 
contractual agreements that took into account the degree of risk and 
anticipated profitability of a trading venture. 39  Contracts thus 
anticipated a variety of circumstances and contingencies pertaining to 
the itinerary and the inter-personal trust involved in the trading 
venture. 40  Given that the entire maritime commercial infrastructure 
relied on credit, creditors made profits from transactions where high 
 
36 On the economic and insurance information that can be teased out from shipwrecks, 
see Gibbins 2001; Bresson 2016: 89-90, 283-84. 
37 The economic system was based on acquired experience and shared knowledge of 
everyone involved in maritime trading, making it possible to stimulate trade while 
also diminishing the inevitable risks of seafaring for everyone involved; a business 
practice now known as “risk pooling” (Bresson 2016: 280-83). 
38 Bresson and Bresson 2004: 8-9. By also looking at grain trade prices, the Bressons 
further explain how the leverage investment system made borrowing preferable for 
the trader because he did not have to put his whole fortune at stake. We may also 
note the treatise De Contractibus by the Franciscan monk Olivi in the 13th century, 
that assigns numerical values to the perceived risk of maritime insurance contracts. 
For Marie-France and Bernard Bru, Olivi’s calculations of gains and risk are 
comparable to those of the founders of the insurance science in the 20th century. 
Bru & Bru 2018: 320. 
39 Cohen 1992: 53-55. 
40 Using New Institutional Economics, Vincent Gabrielsen shows how the ancient 
Greek state promoted systems of trust and information sharing that resulted in 
lower transaction costs (Gabrielsen 2016: 87). 
PAUL VĂDAN  30 
risks yielded high rewards, which in turn allowed them to absorb the risk 
of an individual disaster like the sinking of a ship.41 
These trading ventures thus speak to the complex interplay between 
collective and individual risk. Like in a game of dice, the risk was indeed 
common to all investors but each investor still had to decide whether the 
venture was personally worthwhile in the first place. See, for instance, 
the investment plan recorded in one of the papyri in the Zenon Archive42 
dating from ca. 256-248 BCE, where a certain lender offers Zenon three 
investment propositions for the exploitation of a trade ship for the 
period of a year, where each option contained different financial 
obligations with respect to crew and taxes, as well as distinct 
opportunities for profit. Whereas it was in the interest of all parties that 
the ship be utilized to make a profit, it was left to Zenon to decide his 
preferred course of action and the financial risk he was willing to expose 
himself to use the ship. 43  Such instances further explain why 
Demosthenes accuses Lakritos of “not sharing in the danger because you 
put nothing on board [the ship],” as per the clause stipulating that any 
kind of payment is only made “upon the ship arriving safely.”44 Lakritos 
made a personal calculation and decided that he was not prepared to 
invest, but still tried to illicitly make a profit without taking on the 
collective financial risk of the venture. Therefore, ancient traders and 
investors not only had a personal incentive to quantify danger, but did 
so using historical data to determine the risk of an investment over time. 
3.  QUANTIFIABLE DEGREES OF DANGER 
 
Demosthenes’ use of the expression “sharing in the danger” is notable 
for its prevalence in political and military discourse. It pertains to the 
 
41 Oliver 2007: 40-41. 
42 P. Cairo Zenon IV 59649. 
43 For a detailed financial analysis of the three investment propositions, see Gachet 
1990. 
44 Dem. 34.33 ἡ συγγραφὴ σωθείσης τῆς νεὼς αὐτὸν ἀποδοῦναι κελεύει τὰ χρήματα […] 
οὐ γὰρ μετέσχηκας τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνθέσθαι.  
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deliberative process of ancient decision-makers,45 and in some cases is 
linked specifically to ancient efforts at quantifying danger. Polybios, for 
instance, describes the Roman practice of “decimation,” where members 
of a cohort accused of cowardice were severely punished with public hu-
miliation and even fatal beatings. Polybios considers the practice a good 
deterrent against cowardice because “the danger and dread of drawing 
the lot hang over all equally, as the outcome is uncertain; and as the pub-
lic disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike.”46 The passage 
expresses what is commonly referred to as “relative perception of risk,” 
where people are willing to accept a probability of harm up to a certain 
threshold, beyond which the risk is considered unacceptable – in this 
case 10%, or one in ten.47 Such use of numerical “odds” is just one of the 
ways in which probabilities were expressed, and we have examples 
where one’s risk threshold could be swayed towards taking more risks 
based on the increased amount of coined money promised to them.48 
While we do not always have detailed pay information, we can still 
glimpse into how individuals quantified danger in terms of money as 
they weighed the potential rewards against the risk of participating in 
collective action. 
Nor was Polybios describing “decimation” as a uniquely Roman way 
of approaching danger - pace Beard - as we find other instances in ancient 
 
45 For other telling examples of personal calculations for getting involved in collective 
risky initiatives, see Isoc. 4.97.7 on the Spartans’ decision to join the Athenians 
against the Persians. Also, Xen. Cyr. 5.5.20 where one of the Persian King’s men is 
excused from sharing in the danger because he did not think it was personally safe 
to pursue the enemy. Conversely, the Macedonian general Parmenion was willing to 
gamble his life over his plan to engage the Persians by sea, saying that “he was 
willing even to embark himself and share in the danger,” only to be dismissed by 
Alexander as flawed in his judgement. Arr. Anab. 1.18.6-7. 
46 Polyb. 6.38.3-4 λοιπὸν τοῦ μὲν κινδύνου καὶ φόβου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον ἐπ᾿ ἴσον 
ἐπικρεμαμένου πᾶσιν, ὡς ἂν ἀδήλου τοῦ συμπτώματος ὑπάρχοντος. 
47 For more on “relative perception of risk,” see Vădan 2018: 42 n. 59. 
48 Alexander the Great, for instance, was able to convince his tired Macedonians to 
continue campaigning eastward by promising them to “make them the objects of 
envy to those at home, and stir up the rest of the Macedonians to readiness for shar-
ing the same dangers and hardships.” Arr. 7.8.1 ἐπιδώσει δὲ <τοῖς> μένουσιν ὅσα 
αὐτούς τε ζηλωτοτέρους ποιήσει τοῖς οἴκοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Μακεδόνας ἐξορμήσει ἐς 
τὸ ἐθέλειν τῶν αὐτῶν κινδύνων τε καὶ πόνων μετέχειν. 
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Greek literature of conveying degrees of danger in terms of numerical 
“odds.” Diodorus Siculus tells us about the panicked call by Pancylus Pau-
cus to his fellow Capuans to surrender to Hannibal during the Second 
Punic War:  
 
He was driven out of his mind for fear of Hannibal, and he swore to 
his fellow citizens a peculiar oath: ‘If’, he said, ‘there were still one 
chance in a hundred for the Romans, he would not go over to the Car-
thaginians; but since the superiority of the enemy was clear and dan-
ger was at their gates, it was necessary to yield to superiority.’49 
 
Pancylus’ words are strongly rhetorical, highlighting fear as a driving 
force in shaping a group’s risk calculations. But beyond the trope of emo-
tions overcoming reason, the passage also suggests that the audience – 
and, by extension, Diodorus’ readers – would have understood the 
strength of his message because they understood its probabilistic logic. 
Pancylus’ calculation may not have been necessarily accurate but is nev-
ertheless expressive of the cognitive ability to assign an abstract fraction 
to an outcome. Similarly, Xenophon in the Anabasis also uses fractions to 
underline the danger that his fellow Greeks were in during their journey 
back to Greece. He reports that the envoy of the Persian King snidely tells 
them that “if you have one chance in ten thousand to save yourselves by 
continuing to fight against the King, I advise you not to give up your 
arms.”50 Again, the odds given by the envoy were clearly rhetorical and 
were simply meant to suggest that in fact the Greeks had little chance of 
escape. Even so, for Spiegelhalter such basic expressions of numerical 
“odds” are sufficient to identify one’s cognitive ability to understand and 
 
49 Diod. Sic. 26.10 ὁ δὲ ἐκτὸς τῶν φρενῶν γεγονὼς διὰ τὸν Ἀννίβου φόβον ὤμοσε τοῖς 
πολίταις ἰδιότροπον ὅρκον. ἔφησε γάρ, εἰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐλπίδα μίαν εἶχεν ἐν τοῖς 
Ῥωμαίοις, οὐκ ἂν μετέστη πρὸς Καρχηδονίους· νῦν δὲ φανερᾶς οὔσης τῆς τῶν 
πολεμίων ὑπεροχῆς καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ταῖς πύλαις ἐφεστῶτος, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ταῖς 
ὑπεροχαῖς εἴκειν. 
50 Xen. Anab. 2.1.18-19 Φαλῖνος δὲ ὑποστρέψας παρὰ τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ εἶπεν· ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν 
τῶν μυρίων ἐλπίδων μία τις ὑμῖν ἐστι σωθῆναι πολεμοῦντας βασιλεῖ, συμβουλεύω 
μὴ παραδιδόναι τὰ ὅπλα· εἰ δέ τοι μηδεμία σωτηρίας ἐστὶν ἐλπὶς ἄκοντος βασιλέως, 
συμβουλεύω σῴζεσθαι ὑμῖν ὅπῃ δυνατόν. 
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represent probabilities without the need of complex mathematical mod-
els.51  
Indeed, the probabilistic thinking expressed in these examples is un-
derlined by the use of the term ἐλπίς to convey chances of success. Doug-
las Cairns (2016) reminds us that the word does not only mean “hope,” 
as we are sometimes wont to translate it, but can also mean “expecta-
tion” in relation to rational deliberation and endurance.52 The term it-
self, therefore, signals the futurity inherent in probabilistic thinking, as 
protagonists formulate expectations by resorting to observation and de-
liberation to determine what actions are likely to have higher odds of 
success. It is in fact telling that early modern mathematicians also re-
sorted to ἐλπίς, so to speak, to explain observable probabilities. Indeed, 
in the wake of Blaise Pascal’s publication of his Usage du Triangle Arithmé-
tique, French mathematicians began using the phrase “espérance mathé-
matique” to refer to quantifiable probabilities; literally “mathematical 
hope.” That is not to say that the French word “éspoir” and the Greek 
ἐλπίς are causally linked, but that the probabilistic concept behind their 
usage is fundamentally the same, despite different technologies.  
I would thus argue that the language of expectation is more useful 
than the metaphor of dice when accounting for probability in real socio-
political circumstances. Crises and conflicts do not take place in a con-
trolled environment but in a world of changing circumstances, and the 
language of expectation shows us how ancient decision-makers were 
able to communicate probabilistic variations. For instance, in one of the 
myriads of local conflicts that make the history of Hellenistic Anatolia a 
mire of confusion, the people of Pednelissos were being besieged by their 
neighbors the Selgians, during the summer of 218 BCE and were about to 
surrender. But after receiving positive news that the Seleukid general 
Achaios would send the help that they had earlier asked for, “The 
Pednelissans undertook the siege boldly, relying on their hopes (ἐλπίσι) 
of salvation, and Achaios, appointing Garsyeris to command the expedi-
tion, dispatched him with six thousand foot and five hundred horse to 
 
51 Spiegelhalter 2011: 21-22. 
52 Cairns 2016: 43-44. 
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the Pednelissans’ assistance.”53 The timely promise of assistance thus led 
the defenders to alter their risk calculations, feeling confident that their 
chances of success were increased, which in turn induced them to perse-
vere under siege. In the absence of game theoretical scenarios and equa-
tions, the Pednelissans speak to the cognitive ability of Hellenistic com-
munities to articulate probabilities in culturally specific terms. The dif-
ference between ancient and modern probability, therefore, appears as 
one of form rather than substance. 
4.  QUANTIFYING WAR AND PEACE 
 
As our previous examples show, “odds” of success were often correlated 
to concrete numbers. Since war was the most dangerous game to play, 
ancient military commanders were understandably concerned with 
determining their “odds” of victory. They did so in part by tallying up 
and comparing the number and composition of armies and resources.54 
Indeed, ancient historians offer many examples of commanders deciding 
on a course of action based on their (in)sufficient forces compared to 
 
53 Polyb. 5.72.1-3 κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν θερείαν Πεδνηλισσεῖς, πολιορκούμενοι καὶ 
κινδυνεύοντες ὑπὸ Σελγέων, διεπέμψαντο περὶ βοηθείας πρὸς Ἀχαιόν. τοῦ δ᾿ 
ἀσμένως ὑπακούσαντος, οὗτοι μὲν εὐθαρσῶς ὑπέμενον τὴν πολιορκίαν, 
προσανέχοντες ταῖς ἐλπίσι τῆς βοηθείας, ὁ δ᾿ Ἀχαιός, προχειρισάμενος Γαρσύηριν 
μετὰ πεζῶν ἑξακισχιλίων, ἱππέων δὲ πεντακοσίων, ἐξαπέστειλε σπουδῇ 
παραβοηθήσοντα τοῖς Πεδνηλισσεῦσιν. 
54 For instance, the Punic Wars are described by Polybios as an arms race, where both 
sides initially thought that the contest was even, which in turn spurred each of them 
to acquire more ships and manpower. Polyb. 1.25.5. We are also told that, desperate 
to increase their odds of victory, the Romans “were so alarmed and anxious as to the 
future that they decided to bring into action not four legions but eight.” See Polyb. 
3.107.9 προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὀκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτ᾿ 
ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἑκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἄνδρας εἰς 
πεντακισχιλίους χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων. On the numbers at the battle of Cannae, see 
also Polyb. 3.117. See also Polyb. 1.53.10 on the Carthaginians who considered them-
selves not strong enough to engage the Romans on account of their inferior num-
bers. 
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those of the enemy.55 This has led me (Vădan 2018) to argue that Hellen-
istic decision-makers understood the concept of risk as a deliberative ex-
pertise, a τέχνη expressed through verbs like κινδυνεύω or κρίνω, based 
on one’s experience, knowledge, and sagacity. 56  In turn, Roel 
Konijnendijk (2020) has recently shown that “Classical Greeks would not 
have accepted the gamble of battle in the open without careful delibera-
tion.” 57  This attitude, in turn, explains why Xenophon and Aristotle 
 
55 Xen. Anab. 3.4.14, 7.1.20; Polyb. 1.53.10, 1.25.5, Fr. 6 (Suda α 1312). In this light, the 
wars of the Athenians and Macedonians against the Persian Empire are the excep-
tions that strengthen the rule, so to speak, where local communities and potential 
allies “had little respect for the small numbers of the [former] but were much im-
pressed with the great size of the [latter], abandoned Alexander and came over to 
Dareios. They brought the Persians food and other materials with great goodwill, 
and based on their own decision they foretold the victory of the barbarians.” Diod. 
Sic. 17.32.4 οἱ δ᾿ ἐγχώριοι τῆς μὲν τῶν Μακεδόνων ὀλιγότητος καταφρονήσαντες, τὸ 
δὲ πλῆθος τῆς τῶν Περσῶν στρατιᾶς καταπεπληγμένοι καταλιπόντες τὸν 
Ἀλέξανδρον προσέθεντο τῷ Δαρείῳ καὶ τάς τε τροφὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν 
μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας ἐχορήγουν τοῖς Πέρσαις καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας κρίσεως 
προεσήμαινον τοῖς βαρβάροις τὴν νίκην. On the size of the Persian Army, see also 
Hdt. 7.184-87 and later during the campaign of Alexander Arr. Anab. 3.8.3-6. At the 
same time, others sought to make their army seem larger so as to deter an enemy 
attack or to psychologically overwhelm the opponent to surrender, as in the case of 
the siege of Rhodes where Demetrios the Besieger made sure that “the whole space 
between the island and the opposite shore was seen to be filled with his vessels, 
which brought great fear and panic to those who were watching from the city.” Diod 
Sic. 20.83.1 ὥστε πάντα τὸν ἀνὰ μέσον τόπον τῆς τε νήσου καὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης 
παραλίας συμπεπληρωμένον φαίνεσθαι τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ πολὺν φόβον καὶ 
κατάπληξιν παρέχεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως θεωροῦσιν. For this strategy, see also 
Xen. 3.4.13 and Plut. Eum. 15. We can think of such prognostications (προσημασίαι) 
as the “odds” calculated with concrete numbers that in turn informed the decisions 
of the many smaller factions caught between the two main antagonists. 
56 Polybios believed that one’s deliberative expertise could lead one to make seemingly 
“correct” decisions during a crisis; in other words, the κίνδυνος could be calculated 
and handled in any situation. Vădan 2018: 27-40. 
57 Battle was considered a risk that was not always worth taking if necessity did not 
demand it, while “senseless” leaders were censured for “playing dice with the whole 
city at stake.” Xen. Hell. Oxy. 1.2; Diod. Sic. 13.65.2. By contrast, someone like Phryni-
chos was praised by Thucydides for not “running a risk senselessly,” but calculated 
carefully, weighing the potential rewards versus dangers 8.27.2-3 (Konijnendijk 
2020: 183-84). 
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consider it imperative for a leader to know the resources and expenses 
of the state, its diplomatic standing, and the state’s military capability to 
make correct estimations. In his Memorabilia, for instance, Xenophon 
offers an enlightening conversation between Sokrates and a young, 
ignorant Glaukon:  
 
S.  In order to advise about whom to fight, it is necessary to know 
the city’s strength and the enemy’s so that if the city is stronger 
one may recommend going to war, but if weaker, being cautious. 
G.  You are right. 
S.  First then, tell us the naval and military strength of our city, and 
then that of her enemies. 
G.  No, of course I can’t tell you it out of my head. 
S.  Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I would greatly like 
to hear this. 
G.  But, I tell you, I haven’t made any notes either. 
S.  Then we will postpone offering advice about war too for the 
present.58  
 
The dialogue highlights the reliance on the numbers of troops and 
resources to quantify success in a possible conflict and shape foreign 
policy accordingly.59 The detail that such information would have also 
been available in written form (γέγραπται) suggests that a seasoned 
 
58 Xen. Mem. 3.6.8-9 Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τόν γε βουλευσόμενον, πρὸς οὕστινας δεῖ πολεμεῖν, 
τήν τε τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδέναι δεῖ, ἵνα ἐὰν μὲν ἡ τῆς 
πόλεως κρείττων ᾖ, συμβουλεύῃ ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν δὲ ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων, 
εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθῃ. | Ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἔφη. | Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, λέξον ἡμῖν τῆς 
πόλεως τήν τε πεζικὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, εἶτα τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων. | Ἀλλὰ μὰ 
τὸν Δί᾿, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. | Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ γέγραπταί σοι, 
ἔνεγκε, ἔφη· πάνυ γὰρ ἡδέως ἂν τοῦτο ἀκούσαιμι. | Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί᾿, ἔφη, οὐδὲ 
γέγραπταί μοί πω. | Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τήν γε πρώτην 
ἐπισχήσομεν. See also the extensive education young Alexander received from some 
of the finest tutors that his father could hire to get him ready to rule. Plut. Alex. 5. 
59 We may add as a further example Perikles’ detailed account of Attic geography and 
Athenian naval forces to convince his fellow Athenians to persevere in their conflict 
with the Spartans and their allies: “to these Perikles added other arguments, such as 
he was accustomed to do, as proof of their superiority in war.” Thuc. 2.13.7-9 ἔλεγε 
δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.  
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commander like Xenophon would have made balance sheets comparing 
the two forces in an attempt to determine what military action to take. 
And in fact, he gives us such a balance sheet in his Anabasis, in a speech 
to his fellow Greeks that includes an overview of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two opposing forces: 
 
If anyone of you is despondent because we are without horsemen 
while the enemy have plenty at hand, let him reflect that your ten 
thousand horsemen are nothing more than ten thousand men; […] 
moreover, we are on a far surer foundation than your horsemen: they 
are hanging on their horses’ backs, afraid not only of us, but also of 
falling off.60 
 
Xenophon goes on to tell his men that they should not worry either 
about the terrain or about the lack of guides. His address is obviously 
rhetorical to the point of absurdity insofar as having fewer men in a 
foreign country is touted as a benefit; logic is turned on its head. But it 
reveals two important points pertaining to ancient probability. On the 
one hand, Xenophon needed to address his men’s fears because 
according to their own calculations their inferior numbers did decrease 
their chances of returning home to Greece. On the other hand, 
Xenophon’s men also noted that not all troops were alike, and that 
horsemen had different uses and benefits in particular circumstances, 
thus demonstrating combinatorial thinking where not only the number 
but also the type of troops are used to calculate odds of victory.61  
 
60 Xen. Anab. 3.2.17-19 εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν ἀθυμεῖ ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἱππεῖς, τοῖς δὲ 
πολεμίοις πολλοὶ πάρεισιν, ἐνθυμήθητε ὅτι οἱ μύριοι ἱππεῖς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ μύριοί 
εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι· […] οὐκοῦν τῶν γε ἱππέων πολὺ ἡμεῖς ἐπ᾿ ἀσφαλεστέρου ὀχήματός 
ἐσμεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾿ ἵππων κρέμανται φοβούμενοι οὐχ ἡμᾶς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 
καταπεσεῖν. 
61 See also Polybios’ verdict on the battle of Cannae (3.117.4-6) where about seventy 
thousand Romans died: “both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous 
cavalry had contributed to the victory of the Carthaginians, and it demonstrated to 
posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as 
the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal.” 
τὴν μεγίστην χρείαν παρεσχημένου τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τότε καὶ πρὸ 
τοῦ τοῦ τῶν ἱππέων ὄχλου. καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι 
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To be sure, sheer numbers were certainly not the only criterion for 
deciding a battle. One’s talents as a general, the soldiers’ experience, 
their mental state, the character of the battleground, etc., all could prove 
decisive. But for Aristotle numbers were nevertheless a good indicator 
that allowed one to think probabilistically about the future and improve 
their odds of success. One long passage in the Art of Rhetoric is worth 
quoting: 
 
[A leader] should know all the expenses of the state, that if 
superfluous, it may be removed, or if too great, may be curtailed […] 
of these matters it is not possible to acquire a general view from 
individual experience alone, but in view of advising about them it is 
further necessary to be well informed about what has been discovered 
among others. In regard to war and peace, the rhetor should be 
acquainted with the power of the state, how great it is already and 
how great it may possibly become, of what kind it is already and what 
additions may possibly be made to it; […] These matters he should be 
acquainted with, not only as far as his own state is concerned but also 
in reference to neighboring states, and particularly those with whom 
there is a likelihood of war, so toward the stronger a pacific attitude 
may be maintained, and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to 
making war on them may be left to his own state. Again, he should 
know whether their forces are like or unlike his own, for herein also 
advantage or disadvantage may lie.62 
 
πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολέμων καιροὺς ἡμίσεις ἔχειν πεζούς, ἱπποκρατεῖν δὲ τοῖς ὅλοις, 
μᾶλλον ἢ πάντα πάρισα τοῖς πολεμίοις ἔχοντα διακινδυνεύειν. Polybios echoes Xen-
ophon by highlighting how different configurations of troops can generate different 
results that can be quantified loosely in terms of casualties. 
62 Arist. Rhet. 1.4.8-9 (1359b-1360a) Ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν 
δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις 
παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως 
ἁπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων ἐλάττων γένηται· […] ταῦτα 
δ᾿ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν 
παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. […] 
οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ 
πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, | πρὸς δὲ 
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While echoing Xenophon’s emphasis on the size and character of an 
army and its resources, Aristotle is particularly concerned with how this 
information could be manipulated to increase the calculable odds of 
success and help make decisions about the future. Notice, for instance, 
the correlation between addition and possible outcome as expressed by 
the use of the quantitative phrases πόσην ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι (how great 
it may possibly become) and ἥτις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι (whatever it 
may be possible to add) relative not only to one’s own power but also to 
that of their rivals. For Aristotle, even particular differences (ὅμοιαι ἢ 
ἀνόμοιαι) could be quantified, as shown through his use of the infinitives 
πλεονεκτεῖν (to claim more than one’s share, to have an advantage, claim 
a larger share) and ἐλαττοῦσθαι (make smaller, diminish, reduce in 
amount). The moral meaning of the verbs expressing greediness and 
degradation comes from their more technical quantitative meaning 
expressing addition and reduction. In this particular case the infinitives 
signal advantage and disadvantage insofar as they increase or diminish 
one’s odds of success. 
Both Xenophon and Aristotle, then, prescribe how leaders armed with 
detailed information could quantify the (un)certainty of war and peace 
and plan their future steps accordingly. A case in point is Demetrios the 
Besieger’s decision,  
 
though short of money, to double his army by new levies. And when 
some of his friends in surprise asked him, how he expected to pay 
them, when he found it difficult to support a smaller force; “the more 
powerful we are”, he replied, “the weaker we shall find our enemies; 
and the more easily make ourselves masters of their country. From 
thence tribute and free gifts will come in, that will soon fill our 
coffers.”63 
 
τοὺς ἥττους ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς ᾖ τὸ πολεμεῖν. καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνόμοιαι· 
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ταύτῃ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. 
63 Polyaen. 4.7.1 s.v. “Demetrius” Δημήτριος χρήματα οὐκ ἔχων διπλασίους συνέλεξε 
στρατιώτας· καὶ δὴ θαυμάζοντός τινος, πόθεν ἡ μισθοφορὰ τοσούτοις, ὅπου μηδὲ τοῖς 
ἐλάττοσιν, ‘ὅτι’, ἔφη, ‘βαρύτεροι ὄντες ἀσθενεστέρους τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἕξομεν καὶ 
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The passage highlights the fascinating discrepancy in perception 
between Demetrios and his friends. Whereas the latter are solely focused 
on their present circumstances, Demetrios looks to the future by using 
probabilistic thinking to determine the best course of action. In other 
words, his financial gambling is in fact an investment into making his 
chances of possible victory stronger (βαρύτεροι) relative to his soon-to-
be weaker (ἀσθενεστέρους) enemies, by a factor of two, which would in 
turn bring him a significant return on that investment. Demetrios’ 
initiative, like our earlier examples, therefore, reveal that for ancient 
decision-makers statistical thinking became what psychologist Gerd 
Gigerenzer calls “a habit of mind.”64  They had the incentive and the 
inclination to convert various quantities into a single abstract value of 
uncertainty to make informed decisions about present and potential 
dangers.  
5.  QUALITATIVE PROBABILITY 
 
Numbers are not the only means to express probability. Risk analysts 
Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany (2011) explain why estimative 
language plays a crucial role in communicating uncertainty in important 
socio-political contexts: because analytical judgements are inherently 
not certain, decision-makers use probabilistic language to reflect the es-
timates of the likelihood of developments or events.65 Such language ap-
pears prominently in ancient philosophy and forensic oratory, though 
its use by ancient historians regarding practical decision-making has not 
received extensive attention. In fact, historians and local leaders use 
terms like εἰκός to express the probability of an outcome during the 
 
τῆς τούτων χώρας κρατήσομεν, καὶ φόρους οἴσουσιν ἄλλοι, [ἄλλοι] καὶ στεφάνους 
πέμψουσι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν δεδιότες ἤδη.’ 
64 Gigerenzer 2002: 245. 
65 Fischhoff & Kadvany 2011: 126-27. 
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decision-making process.66 In this regard, Thucydides’s use of the term 
during the speech of the Korinthians on the eve of the Peloponnesian 
War is instructive: they explain to their Peloponnesian allies that “For 
many reasons it is likely (εἰκὸς) for us to prevail: firstly, because we are 
superior in numbers and military experience, then because we follow all 
orders ... so if we win a single victory at sea, [the Athenians] are most 
likely (κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς) defeated.”67 Beyond its rhetorical flavor, Thucydi-
des uses this passage to point out that likelihood of success is not merely 
a matter of guesswork but the product of calculation that took into ac-
count perceived experience, general inclination, circumstances and, of 
course, the sheer number of troops, ships and resources. 
Decision theorists interpret such estimations as expressions of “qual-
itative probability”, which represents “a theory of probability based on 
qualitative ordering of events in terms of their likelihood of occur-
rence.”68 In times of crisis, ancient leaders and communities ultimately 
had to choose between a set of difficult options, each with their own dan-
gers and consequences, that could often be reduced to a binary response 
 
66 For detailed discussions and examples of argumentation through likelihood (εἰκός, 
εἰκότα) in forensic oratory, see the contributions by Michael Gagarin and Craig 
Cooper in A Companion to Greek Oratory (Gagarin 2007: 27-36 and Cooper 203-19, re-
spectively). Consider the famous hypothetical example of whether a weak man is 
(un)likely to be charged with assaulting a strong man (and vice-versa) (Arist. Rhet. 
2.24.11). On the one hand, the weaker man would have smaller chances of success 
against a stronger man, which would make him wary of committing such a crime. 
On the other hand, given such general expectations of success, the stronger man 
would also be unlikely to assault a weaker man because everyone would think him 
to be the likely suspect; Gagarin calls it “a reverse argument from likelihood.” Gaga-
rin 2007: 32. For the first uses of the language of probability in Greek literature, start-
ing with the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, see Kennedy 1995: 11-29. On the extensive use 
of εἰκός by Attic rhetoricians to suggest likelihood of guilt based on character rather 
than forensic evidence, see further Kennedy 1995: 64-80. 
67 Thuc. 1.121.4 κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας 
καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας […] μιᾷ 
τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται. 
68 Narens 2007: 29. Note also Meusnier’s (2008: 108) observations on the assumed dis-
continuity in recent scholarship between qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
probability, which leads to the perceived “sudden” appearance of probability theory 
after its “discovery” by Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens. 
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– “yes” or “no”, action or inaction, attack or defend, etc. Preferable 
courses of action could also be expressed through comparative adjec-
tives. As with εἰκός, adjectives add “gradations” of risk to these kinds of 
binary contrasts. Diodorus Siculus, for instance, portrays the convoluted 
history of the Successor Wars that erupted immediately after the death 
of Alexander the Great, through a detailed description of the thought 
process of an otherwise unremarkable commander by the name of 
Peukestes. This Peukestes was one of the many Macedonian leaders who 
had been prominent at Alexander’s court, and who now sought to carve 
the dead King’s empire among themselves. When he was asked by several 
others to send help against an increasingly belligerent and powerful An-
tigonos Monophthalmos, who wanted to take it all for himself, Diodorus 
tells us that:  
 
At first [Peukestes] paid no heed to them […] since he still bore a 
grudge for not receiving a generalship; but later, reasoning with him-
self, he conceded that should Antigonos be victorious, the result 
would be that he himself would lose his satrapy and thus also risked 
(κινδυνεῦσαι) losing his life. Agonizing, therefore, about himself, and 
thinking that he would be more likely (μᾶλλον) to gain the command 
if he had as many soldiers as possible, he brought forth ten thousand 
archers, as they requested.69  
 
The passage’s many verbs of pondering draw our attention on Peukestes’ 
step-by-step thought process in a series of “if… then…” clauses, as we are 
privy to how he determines what his options are, along with their prob-
able consequences. In this context, the comparative μᾶλλον points to 
Peukestes’ deductive logic based on what scenario he deems more likely 
to occur.  
 
69 Diod. Sic. 19.17.5-6 ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐ προσεῖχεν αὐτοῖς, μεμψιμοιρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ 
τετευχέναι τῆς στρατηγίας, ὕστερον δὲ δοὺς αὑτῷ λόγον συνεχώρησεν ὅτι 
κρατήσαντος Ἀντιγόνου συμβήσεται καὶ τὴν σατραπείαν αὐτὸν ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ περὶ 
τοῦ σώματος κινδυνεῦσαι. ἀγωνιῶν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας μᾶλλον 
τεύξεσθαι νομίζων ὡς πλείστους ἔχων στρατιώτας προσήγαγεν, καθάπερ ἠξίουν, 
τοξότας μυρίους. 
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However, the full force of Diodorus’ passage would be lost if we simply 
agreed that we are dealing with a “rational” actor who eventually makes 
the objectively “correct” choice. His account is not merely retrospective 
but captures the internal doubt and discomfort of Peukestes in having to 
make a difficult choice. We see the commander literally agonizing 
(ἀγωνιῶν) over the preferable course of action. Having to help others at 
the expense of Antigonos, even though likely more beneficial, is not a 
particularly comforting thought considering the agonistic character of 
Macedonian politics. Peukestes settles on a solution by conjuring up dif-
ferent potential futures, mirroring Aristotelian decision-trees, each with 
their own series of steps and possible consequences that take into ac-
count military capabilities, geo-political circumstances, but also the per-
sonal character of his rivals; an otherwise notoriously difficult factor to 
quantify using formal statistical analysis. 
Expressions of preference might strike some as not indicative of 
“proper” probabilistic thinking. But Spiegelhalter reminds us that what-
ever probabilistic model we adopt – be it classical or frequentist – it re-
mains true that “probabilities are constructed based on existing 
knowledge, and are therefore contingent,”70 an admittedly controversial 
statement that informs Bruno de Finetti’s famous quote at the beginning 
of this paper, “probability does not exist.” Spiegelhalter takes this state-
ment to mean that “probabilities are not states of the world […], but de-
pend on the relationship between the ‘object’ of the probability assess-
ment, and the ‘subject’ who is doing the assessing.”71 The relational char-
acter of probability thus allows us some insight into how decision-mak-
ers can incorporate even subjective elements such as perceptions, expe-
rience, and emotions into their calculations by assigning to them quali-
tative values and priorities. 
Indeed, the most generative strategy that ancient decision-makers 
used to assess the future was the conceptual linking of the past with the 
present through perceived historical precedents. Particularly in warfare, 
a record of past encounters was touted as indicative of likely outcomes.72 
 
70 Spiegelhalter 2011: 20. 
71 Spiegelhalter 2011: 20-21. 
72 In the Latin context, we have examples from Caesar and Tacitus that express proba-
bility through precedent. Specifically, in Caes. BCiv. 3.73 Caesar gives a speech before 
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Returning to The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle further qualifies the reliability 
of numbers to calculate odds of success by relying on the historical di-
mension to add perspective to the assigned value of state power. He 
states succinctly that “with reference to these matters he must also have 
examined the results not only of the wars waged by his own state, but 
also of those waged by others; for similar results naturally arise from 
similar causes.”73 Aristotle understood that quantitative and qualitative 
probabilities can be brought together by decision-makers to generate 
helpful statistics informing the correlation between past outcomes and 
present circumstances. Polybios attributes such a statistical mindset to 
the Roman general’s assessment of the Macedonian enemy before the 
battle of Kynoskephalai in 196 BCE, which would humble the Macedonian 
kingdom and establish a Roman presence in subsequent Greek affairs. 
Facing the professional army of Philip V, the Roman general Titus Quinc-
tius Flamininus delivered a short speech to his troops in which he asked 
rhetorically:  
 
Are these not the same Macedonians whom, when they held that des-
perately difficult position in Epirus, you compelled by your valor to 
throw away their shields and flee, never stopping until they got home 
to Macedonia? What reason, then, have you got to be timid now when 
you are about to battle the same men on equal terms? Why not foresee 
the past instead of dreading an opposite outcome, and dare? So, my 
 
his troops after the battle of Dyrrhachium, urging them “not to be discouraged, or 
give way to consternation, upon what had lately happened, but oppose their many 
successful engagements to one slight and inconsiderable check” (ne ea quae accidis-
sent graviter ferrent, neve his rebus terrerentur, multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum 
et id mediocre opponerent). He was careful to point out that their single loss was due to 
their small numbers, as well as unprecedented circumstances and – alas – unfavora-
ble fortune, which was bound to turn in their favor. Similarly, in Tac. Ann. 1.61-62. It 
is also worth noting Caecina’s expertise; he was on his fortieth campaign. His expe-
rience of success and peril had made him fearless: Tac. Ann. 1.64.6 quadragesimum id 
stipendium Caecina parendi aut imperitandi habebat, secundarum ambiguarumque rerum 
sciens eoque interritus.  
73 Arist. Rhet. 1.4.9 (1360a) ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους 
πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν 
ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. 
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men, encouraging each other, dash on to the fray and put forth all 
your strength. For with the gods willing, I feel sure that this battle will 
end like the earlier dangers.74 
 
Polybios uses the speech to bring attention to the morale boost that past 
victories gave the troops, a practice that many generals routinely used. 
But Polybios also touches on the deliberative process that informed the 
soldiers’ confidence. In other words, precedent did not cause an auto-
matic reaction, but was rationally consulted. Flamininus stimulates his 
men’s observational skills to get them to realize that they are fighting 
the same enemy under comparable conditions, appealing to the image of 
the enemy’s previous cowardice to drive home his point. He then encour-
ages them to maintain their determination – based on past outcomes, 
there is no real reason for them to expect a different result. The interplay 
between past and future is elegantly highlighted by the call “to foresee 
the past.” In using this phrase, Polybios stakes a claim that the Romans’ 
stance was not merely a matter of courage and honor, but was the result 
of an informed decision based on previous encounters with similar out-
comes, which in turn helped Flamininus calculate the projected risk of 
the battle. 
Xenophon makes a similar pitch to his Greek companions at the out-
set of the Anabasis. He claims that he entertained – the gods willing – 
many and beautiful hopes of salvation,75 not only because they them-
selves were righteous pious men fighting against perjurers, bound to in-
cur the wrath of gods. He also relied on the record of the Greeks in their 
past encounters with the Persians, starting from the Persian Wars and 
 
74 Polyb. 18.23.3-6 οὐχ οὗτοι Μακεδόνες εἰσίν, οὓς ὑμεῖς προκατέχοντας τὰς 
ἀπηλπισμένας ἐν Ἠπείρῳ δυσχωρίας ἐκβιασάμενοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀρεταῖς φεύγειν 
ἠναγκάσατε ῥίψαντας τὰ ὅπλα, τέως εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀνεκομίσθησαν; πῶς οὖν ὑμᾶς 
εὐλαβεῖσθαι καθήκει, μέλλοντας ἐξ ἴσου ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς; 
τί δὲ προορᾶσθαι τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τἀναντία δι᾿ ἐκεῖνα καὶ νῦν θαρρεῖν; 
διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρακαλέσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁρμᾶσθε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον 
ἐρρωμένως· θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ταχέως πέπεισμαι ταὐτὸ τέλος ἀποβήσεσθαι τῆς 
παρούσης μάχης τοῖς προγεγονόσι κινδύνοις. 
75 Xen. Anab. 3.2.8 σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς πολλαὶ ἡμῖν καὶ καλαὶ ἐλπίδες εἰσὶ σωτηρίας. Notice 
again the emphasis on “beautiful hopes” to suggest good chance of success. (See Ch. 
1). 
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on to their most recent encounters as part of their support in Cyrus’ bid 
to the throne of Persia, when “you stood in formation against the de-
scendants of those [ancient Persians], who far outnumbered you, and 
were victorious with [the aid of] the gods […] proving to be brave men.”76 
The repeated reference to τοῖς θεοῖς is noteworthy because it also echoes 
Flamininus’ appeal to θεῶν βουλομένων to acknowledge the contingen-
cies of war and the inherent dangers that lie therein.77 But more im-
portantly, Xenophon’s mention of a tradition of victory against the Per-
sians served not only to spur morale, but also to suggest that past en-
counters were instructive on how to deal with the same enemy: 
 
It is now more appropriate to be more daring to go against the enemy, 
for in the past you were ignorant about them, considering their host 
numberless, and nevertheless you dared to go against them with an-
cestral resolution. For now, when you have already had proof that 
they are unwilling to receive your charge even though they are many 
times more numerous, what reason is there for you to fear them?78 
 
Xenophon’s speech is a masterstroke in mass persuasion that discloses 
the great lengths to which commanders would go to equate present con-
ditions to successful past enterprises, particularly in unfavorable situa-
tions. Yet despite the rhetorical character, its probabilistic logic persists 
because, as in Polybios’ example, it is grounded on a cumulative gather-
ing of information. Starting from a point in time when the Greeks were 
ἄπειροι (inexperienced, unused to, unacquainted with) vis-à-vis the en-
emy’s military capabilities, their experiences gradually increase their 
 
76 Xen. Anab. 3.2.15 καὶ τότε μὲν δὴ περὶ τῆς Κύρου βασιλείας ἄνδρες ἦτε ἀγαθοί. 
77 I will explore this topic in a forthcoming article on Polybios’ conceptualization of 
contingency planning. 
78 Xen. Anab. 3.2.16 νῦν δ᾿ ὁπότε περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας ὁ ἀγών ἐστι πολὺ δήπου 
ὑμᾶς προσήκει καὶ ἀμείνονας καὶ προθυμοτέρους εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ 
θαρραλεωτέρους νῦν πρέπει εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἄπειροι ὄντες 
αὐτῶν, τό τε πλῆθος ἄμετρον ὁρῶντες, ὅμως ἐτολμήσατε σὺν τῷ πατρίῳ φρονήματι 
ἰέναι εἰς αὐτούς· νῦν δὲ ὁπότε καὶ πεῖραν ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ θέλουσι καὶ 
πολλαπλάσιοι ὄντες δέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς, τί ἔτι ὑμῖν προσήκει τούτους φοβεῖσθαι;  
FORESEEING THE PAST  47 
knowledge of their enemy, as highlighted by the passage’s many com-
parative adjectives. In such circumstances, a string of past successes is 
suggestive, at least in theory, of future victories.79  
History, as such, was not merely didactic in a moral sense, but was 
thought to contain practical knowledge that could be consulted to deter-
mine one’s odds of success, where numbers and attitudes were placed in 
a historical context to be consulted during ostensibly similar circum-
stances. This tried-and-tested method eventually developed into a stand-
ardized form of education that culminated in the production of technical 
manuals. Xenophon’s On Horsemanship, Aeneas Tacticus’ On the defense of 
Fortified Positions, Onasander’s On Strategy, and Polybios’ now-lost On Tac-
tics, are replete with precedents in various situations that were meant to 
inform a decision-maker’s choices in matters of war and local admin-
istration. Beside oracular consultation and divination, then, ancient 
thinkers also prescribed a probabilistic system of knowledge that ren-
dered the future calculable and thus more imaginable. 
6.  PRECEDENT VERSUS ADAPTATION 
 
Similarity is nevertheless not sameness, especially when statistics are in-
volved. In fact, the logic that past successes necessarily translate into 
further victories is a probabilistic mistake, the so-called “hot hand fal-
lacy.” Especially in warfare, new encounters are independent events, and 
their odds of success will not depend strictly on the past; new conditions, 
information, and many other factors, can influence the outcome. Ancient 
historians were well aware of this logical fallacy and sought to render it 
intelligible for their contemporaries. Xenophon, for instance, expressed 
his support for the Common Peace of 371 BCE by equating the irreden-




79 A similar calculation was made by the Melians after having resisted the Athenians 
earlier in the war (Thuc. 3.91). But in the Melian dialogue Thucydides chooses not to 
emphasize this point and instead make an argument about the pitfalls of relying on 
hollow hope instead of rational calculation (Thuc. 5.116). 
PAUL VĂDAN  48 
I for my part do not commend those men who, when they have be-
come competitors in the games and have already been victorious 
many times and enjoy fame, love winning so much that they do not 
stop until they are defeated and cease their training. Nor, on the other 
hand, do I commend those dicers who, if they win one success, throw 
double stakes (περὶ διπλασίων κυβεύουσιν), for I see that most 
(πλείους) of these people become utterly impoverished (ἀπόρους).80 
 
This bullish attitude is well-known among psychologists and game theo-
rists.81 They agree with Xenophon that, while a lucky few might succeed, 
the great majority of those who adopt it are statistically bound to fail and 
become ἀπόρους, as Xenophon’s use of the comparative adjective 
πλείους suggests. One must instead hedge their bets and be aware of cir-
cumstances and trends, and not “engage in a contest of such a sort that 
we either win all or lose all”;82 blind faith in past outcomes is not enough. 
Xenophon is thus drawing attention to the essential skills of adapta-
tion and improvement that decision-makers must possess. Otherwise, 
they will suffer the fate of the Spartans at the hands of Kallias son of Hip-
ponikos just outside of Korinth in 390 BCE during the so-called Korin-
thian War. Xenophon recounts how, upon splitting up their forces and 
returning to Lechaion, “[the Spartans] were by no means unaware that 
there were many peltasts and many hoplites in Korinth, but on account 
of their previous successes they contemptuously thought that no one 
would attack them.” Their enemies, on the other hand, “when they saw 
that [the Spartans] were few in number, but also unaccompanied by ei-
ther peltasts or cavalry, thought that it was safe to attack them with their 
 
80 Xen. Hell. 6.3.16 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐκείνους ἔγωγε ἐπαινῶ οἵτινες ἀγωνισταὶ γενόμενοι 
καὶ νενικηκότες ἤδη πολλάκις καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντες οὕτω φιλονικοῦσιν ὥστε οὐ 
πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν ἡττηθέντες τὴν ἄσκησιν καταλύσωσιν, οὐδέ γε τῶν 
κυβευτῶν οἵτινες αὖ ἐὰν ἕν τι ἐπιτύχωσι, περὶ διπλασίων κυβεύουσιν· ὁρῶ γὰρ καὶ 
τῶν τοιούτων τοὺς πλείους ἀπόρους παντάπασι γιγνομένους. 
81 Konnikova 2020a; 2020b.  
82 Xen. Hell. 6.3.17 ἃ χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁρῶντας εἰς μὲν τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα μηδέποτε 
καταστῆναι, ὥστ᾿ ἢ πάντα λαβεῖν ἢ πάντ᾿ ἀποβαλεῖν, ἕως δὲ καὶ ἐρρώμεθα καὶ 
εὐτυχοῦμεν. 
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force of peltasts.”83 Xenophon contrasts Kallias’ observation (καθορῶν-
τες) followed by his estimation (ἐνόμισαν) of the changed circumstances 
with the Spartans’ contemptuous heedlessness (καταφρόνησις) to un-
derline the importance of continually being mindful of changes and con-
stantly striving to improve one’s condition, especially in high stakes mat-
ters. 
The example further indicates that in such real-time scenarios, like 
politics or sports, rivals learn from each other with every encounter, 
making the next clash all the more interesting because its outcome is not 
only determined by past results, but also by the changes that each side 
adopts in trying to predict the possible actions of the adversary; a really 
good team, for instance, is able to predict the opposition’s predictions, 
as it were. The rise and rule of Rome offers a fascinating historical case 
study because Greek historians tend to explain it precisely as the result 
of the Romans’ ability to learn from past failures and improve going for-
ward. Their talent is apparent when they manage to overcome their 
more established Carthaginian rivals in the naval arena during the First 
Punic War. The war was rooted in the growing influence of the two Re-
publics in the Western Mediterranean which made an eventual confron-
tation between the two powers virtually unavoidable. Polybios is partic-
ularly interested in this conflict and starts his Histories with it, because 
he interprets it as the first clear proof of the Romans’ future greatness. 
He repeatedly mentions the Romans’ traditional naval (in)experience, 
but adds that “When they once conceived of the project, they took it in 
hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at 
once engaged the Carthaginians, whose hegemony of the sea had been 
undisputed for generations.”84 The Romans, according to Polybios, knew 
that the key to eventual victory against the Carthaginians – or against 
 
83 Xen. Hell. 4.5.12-13 καὶ ὅτι μὲν πολλοὶ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ καὶ πελτασταὶ καὶ ὁπλῖται 
οὐδὲν ἠγνόουν· κατεφρόνουν δὲ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν τύχας μηδένα ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι 
σφίσιν. οἱ δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν Κορινθίων ἄστεως, Καλλίας τε ὁ Ἱππονίκου, τῶν Ἀθηναίων 
ὁπλιτῶν στρατηγῶν, καὶ Ἰφικράτης, τῶν πελταστῶν ἄρχων, καθορῶντες αὐτοὺς καὶ 
οὐ πολλοὺς ὄντας καὶ ἐρήμους καὶ πελταστῶν καὶ ἱππέων, ἐνόμισαν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι 
ἐπιθέσθαι αὐτοῖς τῷ πελταστικῷ. 
84 Polyb. 1.20.12 τότε δὴ πρῶτον ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντες οὕτως τολμηρῶς ἐνεχείρησαν 
ὥστε πρὶν ἢ πειραθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις ναυμαχεῖν 
τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τν κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίαν ἀδήριτον. 
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any enemy, in fact – was beating them at their own game, which meant 
being prepared to accept many losses for the sake of improvement. Look-
ing at the record between the two fleets, people would understandably 
be tempted to bet on the Carthaginians, based on past results. But those 
gamblers would be sorely disappointed as the Romans were eventually 
able to routinely defeat their Punic adversary.  
This tension between precedent and improvement also governs Dio-
dorus Siculus’ account of the interaction between the Carthaginian and 
Roman envoys on the eve of the First Punic War. On their part, the Car-
thaginians appeal to precedent to suggest that they are bound to win any 
future encounter, “[as] they wondered how the Romans dared to cross 
into Sicily while the Carthaginians were the masters of the sea, for it was 
obvious to all that, should they not protect their friendship, they would 
no longer dare to even wash their hands in the sea.”85 By referring to 
their own record of success as φανερὸν πᾶσιν, the Carthaginians warned 
the Romans against trying to threaten their naval prowess. The Romans, 
by contrast, ostensibly emphasized the importance of accumulated ex-
perience to improve where they had failed in the past. Thus, while not 
denying the Carthaginians’ present naval power, they issued a warning 
of their own, that the Carthaginians’ prominence would ultimately prove 
their own undoing: “for the Romans have always turned out to be pupils 
stronger than their teachers.”86  
These passages reveal an ancient understanding of the probabilistic 
feature regarding incremental success currently known among econo-
mists as a “power law,” representing a relationship between two quanti-
ties, like the chances of victory going into battle, where changes in one 
quantity lead to a proportional relative change in another. Whereas in a 
game of dice where statistical data is collected from dice throws with the 
same aleatory chance, this incremental model suggests that one result – 
say one battle between the Romans and the Carthaginians - will then pro-
 
85 Diod. Sic. 23.2.1 οἱ Φοίνικες θαυμάζειν ἔφασαν πῶς διαβαίνειν τολμῶσιν εἰς Σικελίαν 
Ῥωμαῖοι θαλαττοκρατούντων Καρχηδονίων· φανερὸν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ὅτι μὴ 
τηροῦντες τὴν φιλίαν οὐδὲ νίψασθαι τὰς χεῖρας ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τολμήσουσιν. 
86 Diod. Sic. 23.2.1 ‘μαθητὰς γὰρ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀεὶ ὄντας γίνεσθαι κρείττους τῶν 
διδασκάλων.’ 
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portionally impact the chances of the Romans during their next encoun-
ter, and so on. Sergio Da Silva, Raul Matsushita, and Eliza Silveira (2013) 
have looked at sports and war and have found that in both circumstances 
when antagonists compete, “there emerges stasis, as each adaptation by 
one in countered by an adaptation by the other. The co-evolution be-
tween the antagonistic sides eventually reaches equilibrium and a fairly 
regular power law takes place.”87 Eventually, since perfect counter-adap-
tation is unfeasible, one side is bound to gain the upper hand, which in 
turn furthers its chances of success with successive repetitions; pro-
vided, of course, that it remains focused on adapting to circumstances 
and learning how to do things better.88 We find the same phenomenon in 
the case of Roman success, who became increasingly more difficult to 
defeat in any single subsequent encounter because they kept learning, 
adapting, and improving. By the Third Punic War, when Carthage was 
razed to the ground, the Romans only needed marginal refinement 
against their massively disadvantaged enemy.  
Importantly, the Romans were not exceptional in this regard. Histo-
rians use the same logic of adaptation and refinement to explain the rise 
and fall of other erstwhile powers like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. Xen-
ophon explains Athens’ long-term naval superiority through the voice of 
Prokles the Phliasian who observes that 
 
you already possess many triremes and it is your naval tradition 
(ναυτικὸν) to continually add to them. You likewise possess as 
peculiarly your own all the arts and crafts which have to do with ships. 
Again, you are far superior to other men in experience of nautical 
affairs, for most of you get your livelihood from the sea. [… As a result,] 
you have engaged in very many and very great combats by sea, you 
have met with an exceedingly small number of misfortunes and have 
achieved an exceedingly large number of successes. Therefore, it is 
likely that the allies would like best to share in such danger if they 
were under your leadership.89 
 
87 Da Silva, Matsushita & Silveira 2013: 5382-83. 
88 Da Silva, Matsushita & Silveira 2013: 5384-85. 
89 Xen. Hell. 7.1.4-5 ἔτι δὲ τριήρεις κέκτησθε πολλάς, καὶ πάτριον ὑμῖν ἐστι ναυτικὸν 
ἐπικτᾶσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τάς γε τέχνας τὰς περὶ ταῦτα πάσας οἰκείας ἔχετε. καὶ μὴν 
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The technical language used in the passage – ναυτικὸν, τέχνας, ἐμπειριᾳ 
... περὶ τὰ ναυτικά – suggests that Athens’ consistency is not merely the 
result of singular power, but also of military and logistical skills 
diligently refined over time, as implied by the terms πάτρικον and βίος. 
Experience and skill thus work together to create the likelihood (εἰκός) 
that more allies will “share in the danger” (κινδύνου μετέχειν), which 
will in turn further facilitate Athenian success. By contrast, Agesilaos’ 
rigid Spartans ostensibly lost their supremacy at the hands of Epaminon-
das’ Thebans, who proved much more malleable to learn by trial and er-
ror, adapt, improve, and finally surpass their enemy.90 In these examples 
we find echoes of Thucydides’ dictum on the importance of adaptation: 
“necessity states that, just as with a skill (τέχνης), improvements always 
prevail; and though unchanging customs may be best for undisturbed 
communities, constant necessities of action (ἀναγκαζομένοις) must be 
accompanied by the constant improvement of methods 
 
ἐμπειρίᾳ γε πολὺ προέχετε τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὰ ναυτικά· ὁ γὰρ βίος τοῖς πλείστοις 
ὑμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης· […] πλείστους γὰρ καὶ μεγίστους ἀγῶνας ἠγωνισμένοι κατὰ 
θάλατταν ἐλάχιστα μὲν ἀποτετυχήκατε, πλεῖστα δὲ κατωρθώκατε. εἰκὸς οὖν καὶ τοὺς 
συμμάχους μεθ᾿ ὑμῶν ἂν ἥδιστα τούτου τοῦ κινδύνου μετέχειν. 
90 Plutarch has Antalkidas bitterly reproach Agesilaos for “having taught those who 
were neither willing, nor knowledgeable about how to fight.” His first defeat was 
mockingly called “a fine tuition fee that you claim from the Thebans for teaching 
them how to fight when they did not wish it, and did not even know how.” Plut. Ages. 
26.2: ἦ καλὰ τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους μηδὲ 
ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας. Plutarch explains that having to regularly fight 
against the Lakedaimonians ultimately forced the Thebans to become more warlike, 
“such that they were trained (ἐγγυμνασαμένους) through the many campaigns of 
the Lakedaimonians against them.” The use of the verb ἐγγυμνάζειν highlights a 
Theban mindfulness of past failures and, at the same time, a constant effort to im-
prove one’s chances of success. Purportedly, Agesilaos had contravened an ancient 
Lykourgan rhetra that specifically prohibited the Spartans to make frequent cam-
paigns against the same enemy, in order that the enemy “might not learn how to 
make war” (Plut. Ages. 26.3). 
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(ἐπιτεχνήσεως).”91 And since the world is forever bound to change, one 
must always remain vigilant, whether enjoying the height of glory or 
bearing the burden of defeat, because eventually one will be faced with 
opportunities as well as challenges to one’s condition. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article proposes an alternative approach to the problem of proba-
bility in antiquity. By adopting a “frequentist” model based on historical 
knowledge, we can trace a probabilistic mindset of decision-makers who 
developed conceptual tools to calculate the likelihoods of occurrence 
and odds of success in economic, social, and military initiatives. In turn, 
our discussion on ancient probability will further allow us to explore new 
avenues for research beyond the realm of ancient science about the for-
mulation of risk in antiquity, and how ancient decision-making bodies 
understood and undertook contingency planning - both topics of future 
research. Finally, ancient probability invites us to reconsider the notion 
that the ancient Greeks were fundamentally “past-oriented”, and instead 
consider a speculative attitude towards a future that could be scruti-
nized, and even foreseen. Metaphorically speaking, in the valley of an-
cient history the future was not a sudden and mysterious shout, but an 
echo carried by the winds of the present hitting the mountains of the 
past. The Greeks understood that only by knowing the environment 
could one hope to estimate the echo’s path and the distances it traveled.  
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